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OPINION 
__________________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
In 1984, a jury sentenced Scott Wayne Blystone to 
death following his convictions in Pennsylvania state court 
for first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit 
murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery.  After making 
several unsuccessful attempts to overturn his convictions and 
sentence in state court, Blystone filed the present petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that both the 
guilt and penalty phases of his trial were infected with federal 
constitutional error and that he is entitled to a new trial or, at 
a minimum, a new sentencing hearing.  The District Court 
denied relief on all guilt phase claims, but granted the writ as 
to Blystone‘s death sentence, finding that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate, develop, or introduce 
expert mental health testimony and institutional records in 
mitigation, and that the state court‘s decision to the contrary 
was unreasonable.  Accordingly, the District Court remanded 
the case for resentencing.  Thereafter, Blystone filed a Fed. R. 
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Civ. P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment based on 
alleged newly discovered evidence of prosecutorial 
misconduct during the guilt phase of trial.  The District Court 
denied the Rule 59(e) motion, concluding that the evidence 
submitted in support was not, in fact, ―newly discovered.‖ 
 
 Blystone now appeals the District Court‘s denial of his 
Rule 59(e) motion.  The defendants (collectively, the 
―Commonwealth‖) cross-appeal the District Court‘s grant of 
penalty phase relief.  Having approached this case with the 
utmost respect for the deferential standards of review that we 
are obligated to apply, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
 On the morning of September 10, 1983, a passerby 
discovered the body of Dalton Charles Smithburger, Jr., lying 
near a road in Fayette County, Pennsylvania.  Smithburger 
had sustained six gunshot wounds to the back of the head.  
―Blystone eluded detection as Smithburger‘s murderer for 
over three months.  However, his associates eventually 
exposed him.‖  Commonwealth v. Blystone, 549 A.2d 81, 84 
(Pa. 1988) (―Blystone I‖).  First to contact the police was 
Miles Miller.  Miller told the police that he had information 
implicating Blystone in Smithburger‘s murder and agreed to 
wear a tape recorder and transmitter during a meeting with 
Blystone in the hopes of eliciting a confession.  In the course 
of this meeting, Blystone admitted to robbing Smithburger of 
thirteen dollars and then shooting him. 
 
5 
 
 At trial, the Commonwealth introduced portions of 
Blystone‘s taped conversation with Miller into evidence.  The 
jury heard Blystone‘s ―own voice bragging in vivid and grisly 
detail of the killing of [Smithburger.]‖  Blystone I, 549 A.2d 
at 84.  Blystone recounted that he had been out in his car with 
his girlfriend, Jackie Guthrie, his friend, George Powell, and 
Powell‘s girlfriend, Barbara Clark.  In need of cash, Blystone 
picked up Smithburger, a hitchhiker, and asked him to 
contribute gas money.  When Smithburger replied that he 
could only give him a few dollars, Blystone pulled out a gun 
and, in his own words, ―almost splattered him right there in 
the car.‖  Blystone then stopped driving and told Smithburger 
to get out.  Having first led Smithburger away from the car, 
Blystone searched his belongings and found thirteen dollars.  
Blystone took the money and then ran back to the car to tell 
his friends that he was going to kill the hitchhiker.  Upon 
making this pronouncement, Blystone immediately returned 
to where Smithburger stood and asked him to describe 
Blystone‘s car.  Smithburger accurately described the car, so 
Blystone said ―goodbye‖ and ―wasted him.‖  He proceeded to 
shoot Smithburger six times.  
 
 Barbara Clark‘s testimony at trial largely corroborated 
the story that Blystone recounted to Miller in the tape 
recorded conversation.  She recalled that on September 9, 
1983, Blystone offered Smithburger a ride and asked him for 
gas money.  When Smithburger said he only had a couple of 
dollars, Blystone pulled out a gun on him.  Clark heard six 
gun shots after the two men exited the car.  Upon returning to 
the car, Blystone announced to his passengers that he had 
taken thirteen dollars from Smithburger.   Jackie Guthrie‘s 
testimony corroborated Barbara Clark‘s in all respects.   
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Before resting its case, the Commonwealth also 
presented testimony establishing that the bullets retrieved 
from Smithburger‘s body were of the .22 caliber class, and 
that Blystone had stolen a .22 caliber pistol prior to the 
murder.  Jackie Guthrie confirmed that the gun Blystone had 
stolen was the same gun he used to shoot Smithburger.  
Blystone called no witnesses and presented no evidence in his 
defense.   
 
On June 13, 1984, a jury empaneled by the Court of 
Common Pleas of Fayette County, Pennsylvania, convicted 
Blystone of first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to 
commit murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery.  
Following the verdict, and outside of the jury‘s presence, 
Blystone‘s attorney, Jeffrey Whiteko, told the judge that 
Blystone wished to offer no evidence in mitigation at the 
penalty phase of the trial.  Whiteko claimed to have had 
lengthy discussions with Blystone about the benefits of 
presenting a mitigation case.  He asserted that he strongly 
objected to Blystone‘s decision and he expressed a desire to 
put Blystone and his parents on the stand at the sentencing 
phase of the trial.   
 
Thereafter, the judge conducted a colloquy with 
Blystone in which he explained that the jury would determine 
the penalty and that the sentencing hearing was Blystone‘s 
only opportunity to present the jury with mitigating evidence.  
The judge explained the role that aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances would play in the jury‘s decision and informed 
Blystone that, while the prosecution had the burden of 
proving aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable 
doubt, Blystone had the burden of proving mitigating 
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circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence.  The judge 
then listed the statutory mitigating circumstances.   
 
Noting that Blystone had an absolute right to remain 
silent, the judge asked him to consider the effect of his failure 
to present any mitigating evidence, and explained that he 
could not later argue that he did not have an opportunity to 
offer testimony.  After taking a moment to confer with 
Whiteko, Blystone had the following exchange with the 
judge: 
 
JUDGE ADAMS: Do you wish to testify yourself or 
to have your parents testify or to 
offer any other evidence in this 
case? 
    … 
 
MR. BLYSTONE: I have no testimony and no 
witnesses. 
 
JUDGE ADAMS: Either through yourself or anyone 
else? 
 
MR. BLYSTONE: No. 
    … 
 
JUDGE ADAMS: Can you state for the record why 
it is that you do not want to offer 
any testimony? 
 
MR. BLYSTONE: I don‘t want anybody else brought 
into it. 
    … 
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JUDGE ADAMS: Is that your only reason for not 
offering any testimony? 
 
DEFENDANT SHAKES HIS HEAD ―YES.‖ 
 
JUDGE ADAMS: Of course, if you testify yourself 
that would not be bringing anyone 
into it except yourself, do you 
understand? 
 
MR. BLYSTONE: Uh-huh. 
 
Appendix (―App.‖) 970-72.  At the conclusion of the 
colloquy, the judge stated for the record that he found 
Blystone to be an intelligent man who understood the 
consequences of his decision.  The jurors then reentered the 
courtroom and the judge informed them that Blystone had 
chosen not to present mitigating evidence at sentencing.  The 
judge reminded the jurors that Blystone had an absolute right 
to remain silent and instructed them to consider all evidence 
presented to them in the course of the trial to determine 
whether mitigating circumstances existed.   
 
 The Commonwealth argued that the jury should find, 
as an aggravating circumstance, that Blystone committed the 
murder in the perpetration of a felony, in accordance with the 
jury‘s verdict that Blystone was guilty of robbery.  See 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(6).  Whiteko argued against the penalty 
of death.  The jury inevitably found one aggravating 
circumstance — that Blystone ―committed a killing while in 
the perpetration of a felony,‖  id. — and no mitigating 
circumstances.  Accordingly, the jury imposed a death 
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sentence for the murder conviction, as required by 
Pennsylvania law under the circumstances.  Id. § 
9711(c)(1)(iv) (―[T]he verdict must be a sentence of death if 
the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating 
circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating 
circumstance[.]‖).  The judge imposed an independent 
sentence of ten to twenty years of imprisonment for the 
robbery conviction. 
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction and sentence on direct appeal.  Blystone I, 549 
A.2d at 81.  Thereafter, Blystone appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to decide 
whether the mandatory aspect of the Pennsylvania death 
penalty statute impermissibly limited the jury‘s discretion in 
deciding the penalty, in violation of the constitution.  
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 303 (1990).   
Rejecting Blystone‘s constitutional challenge, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the death sentence.  Id.  
 
B. 
 
The Governor of Pennsylvania signed Blystone‘s death 
warrant in 1995 and, thereafter, Blystone retained post-
conviction counsel, obtained a stay of execution, and filed a 
petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (―PCRA‖) in 
Pennsylvania state court, raising numerous claims for relief 
based on alleged constitutional defects in both the guilt and 
penalty phases of his trial.  The PCRA court held an 
evidentiary hearing on Blystone‘s primary claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  A summary of the evidence 
presented at that hearing follows. 
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 Whiteko, Blystone‘s trial lawyer, testified that he 
graduated law school in 1982 and, after completing a one-
year judicial clerkship, began working part-time at the Public 
Defender‘s Office.  He had only three months experience as a 
practicing attorney when he was appointed to this capital 
case.  At the time of Blystone‘s June 1984 trial, Whiteko had 
represented criminal defendants in approximately twenty 
trials, none of them murder cases.  Whiteko testified that the 
Chief Public Defender assisted him with the preliminary 
hearing and voir dire in Blystone‘s case, and that he had the 
help of an investigator to prepare for the guilt phase, but that 
he had no assistance in preparing for the sentencing phase of 
trial.   
 
Whiteko knew that, if the jury found Blystone guilty of 
both murder and robbery, Blystone would automatically be 
subject to at least one statutory aggravating circumstance — 
committing the murder in the course of another felony.  
Nonetheless, Whiteko conducted an extremely limited 
investigation into the sort of potentially mitigating evidence 
that might have permitted the jury to avoid imposing the 
death penalty.  Indeed, in preparation for the penalty phase, 
Whiteko interviewed, at most, four people:  Blystone, his 
parents, and one of his sisters, whom Whiteko unintentionally 
encountered in the hallway of the courthouse during trial.   
 
Whiteko told the PCRA court that he conducted the 
most extensive of these interviews with Blystone‘s father, 
Norman.  After reading the list of statutory mitigating factors 
to Norman, Whiteko asked Norman to describe Blystone‘s 
life from childhood until the time of trial.  Whiteko recounted 
that he chose to focus his limited investigation on Blystone‘s 
parents because he thought that Blystone had a ―good chance 
11 
 
at [establishing] mitigating factors‖ through their testimony.  
App. 1145.  He believed Blystone‘s parents to be sincere and 
thought that they would present a good picture of their son‘s 
troubled past.  Whiteko never intended to present any 
testimony at sentencing other than that of Blystone and his 
parents.   Finally, Whiteko explained to the PCRA court that 
Blystone would not accept a plea to a life sentence because he 
did not want to spend his life in prison.  Thus, it was 
Whiteko‘s understanding of his client‘s instructions that, if 
convicted, Blystone would not permit him to call witnesses or 
to beg for mercy at sentencing.  App. 1161-64. 
 
Blystone then presented a number of lay witnesses to 
the PCRA court in order to establish that his life history was 
replete with potentially mitigating evidence, which Whiteko 
could have uncovered through a more extensive investigation 
of his background.  First, Blystone‘s father, Norman, testified 
in detail about his son‘s troubled childhood.  Norman 
recounted that Blystone was hit in the head with a steel swing 
when he was four years old.  The accident left him with a 
large gash on his temple and knocked him unconscious, and 
afterward, Blystone suffered from recurring headaches, 
seizures, fevers, and night sweats.  Blystone started to have 
behavioral problems at age six or seven.  From the ages of 
seven to twelve, Norman disciplined him physically for his 
frequent misbehavior.  Norman would typically hit him with a 
belt and his hand once or twice a week.  At times, Norman 
kicked him on his backside.  Blystone‘s mother would 
occasionally intervene when she felt Norman‘s efforts to 
discipline Blystone were excessive.   
Norman informed the PCRA court that, as a child, 
Blystone developed a nervous habit of pulling out his hair 
until there was a bald spot.  Blystone had no interests or 
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hobbies as a teenager; he ran away from home often; he slept 
in the closet; he suffered nightmares; he exhibited bizarre 
behavioral changes; and he made up incredible stories about 
himself.   Blystone was also a risk-taker:  he abused alcohol, 
he engaged in self-mutilation, such as burning himself with 
cigarettes, and, on one occasion, he rolled under a moving 
train. 
 
When Blystone was in his late teens, Norman allowed 
him to live in a cottage on the family property with his 
girlfriend, Jackie Guthrie.  Norman told Blystone that Guthrie 
had to leave after the couple began having problems.  Instead 
of asking Guthrie to move out, however, Blystone chose to 
live with her in his car.  This occurred shortly before 
Smithburger‘s murder.  Norman testified that Blystone was 
regularly under the influence of alcohol during the time 
leading up to the homicide.  Finally, Norman asserted that 
Whiteko had neither discussed the list of mitigating 
circumstances with him prior to sentencing, nor asked him 
whether he knew of other potential witnesses who could offer 
mitigating evidence.
1
 
 
Blystone‘s younger sister, Cindy Guthrie,2 elaborated 
on Blystone‘s substance abuse issues during the PCRA 
hearing, testifying that he used both drugs and alcohol to 
                                              
1
 The parties stipulated that Norma Blystone, Blystone‘s 
mother, would provide testimony similar to that of her 
husband. 
 
2
 For the sake of clarity, Cindy Guthrie is the sister-in-law of 
Blystone‘s girlfriend, Jackie Guthrie.  App. 1259. 
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excess.  She stated that she never discussed Blystone‘s 
behavior with Whiteko prior to sentencing.  Rather, her only 
contact with Whiteko was a brief conversation in the hallway 
of the courthouse just before sentencing.
3
   
 
 Blystone‘s uncle, Kenneth Blystone, testified that he 
lived near his nephew in Maryland until Blystone was about 
fifteen years old.  He stated that Blystone appeared normal as 
a young boy, but later became withdrawn.  Kenneth believed 
that, though Blystone needed help, he was fundamentally a 
good man.  He made clear that he would have testified on 
Blystone‘s behalf at sentencing or, at least, discussed the 
matter with Whiteko, had he been asked to do so. 
 
 Lawrence Short, a close friend of Blystone‘s as a 
teenager, testified that he and Blystone enlisted in the Navy 
together at age seventeen.  Though the two men went their 
separate ways after enlisting, they remained in periodic 
contact for some time.  Short knew that Blystone was unable 
to conform to the discipline required in the Navy, and that 
this behavioral deficiency resulted in his discharge.  Short 
testified that, during the course of their friendship, he bore 
witness to Blystone‘s self-mutilation and substance abuse.  
He also testified that he heard Blystone tell exaggerated 
stories about himself.  Short, too, would have been willing to 
testify on Blystone‘s behalf at sentencing, had he been asked 
to do so. 
 
                                              
3
 The parties stipulated that Blystone‘s other sister, Julie Dice, 
would have corroborated Cindy Guthrie‘s testimony and that 
Whiteko had no contact with Ms. Dice prior to or at the trial. 
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Sharon Smitley testified that Blystone attended her 
birthday party on the night of the homicide.  She stated that 
Blystone had been drinking and using marijuana at the party, 
and that she asked him to leave after he became too 
intoxicated.
4
   
 
 Blystone next presented expert mental health 
testimony to establish before the PCRA court that he suffered 
from serious untreated brain damage and psychiatric 
disorders, all of which were aggravated by a history of poly-
substance abuse. 
 
Dr. Patricia Fleming, a clinical psychologist and 
neuropsychologist who has provided expert testimony in 
numerous death penalty proceedings in both federal and state 
court, testified that she saw Blystone three times in the month 
leading up to the PCRA hearing and spent eleven to twelve 
hours with him.  During this time, she interviewed Blystone, 
administered psychological tests, and reviewed his records, as 
well as the affidavits of family members.  After performing 
her investigation, Dr. Fleming diagnosed Blystone, to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty, with organic brain 
damage.  She stated that physical indicia supporting a 
diagnosis of brain damage were present from Blystone‘s 
infancy:  he was a frail baby that did not eat much and 
suffered from chronic high fever and seizures.  The diagnosis 
of brain damage was further supported by Blystone‘s early 
malnutrition, abnormal sleep patterns, irritability, and 
hyperactivity as a young child.  Dr. Fleming also diagnosed 
Blystone with bipolar disorder.  She explained that this 
                                              
4
 Smitley also testified on Blystone‘s behalf at the 1985 
hearing on his post-trial motions. 
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disorder is characterized by major depressive episodes — 
exemplified by Blystone‘s habit of sleeping in the closet, his 
withdrawn behavior, and his self-mutilation — alternating 
with periods of marked agitation — exemplified by 
Blystone‘s bouts of insomnia, frequent exaggerated stories, 
and abuse of drugs and alcohol.  Dr. Fleming further 
diagnosed Blystone with borderline personality disorder, 
which is typified by unstable relationships, mood fluctuations, 
and severe agitation.  Finally, Dr. Fleming diagnosed 
Blystone with poly-substance abuse, which she believed 
exacerbated his other disorders.   
 
 Next, Dr. Alec Whyte, a psychiatrist who has testified 
in more than 400 criminal trials, testified before the PCRA 
court.  Like Dr. Fleming, Dr. Whyte diagnosed Blystone with 
borderline personality disorder, bipolar mood disorder, and 
organic personality disorder caused by physical injury to the 
brain.
5
  Importantly, both doctors agreed that qualified 
experts had all of the means necessary to arrive at the same 
diagnoses based upon the information available at the time of 
trial.   
Drs. Fleming and Whyte each testified to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty that Blystone‘s capacity to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time 
of the homicide was substantially impaired by his mental 
disorders.  Dr. Fleming opined that Blystone was under 
                                              
5
 Dr. Whyte testified that he believed Blystone‘s brain 
damage was caused by the serious head injury he sustained at 
age four.  Whether the damage was present at birth, as opined 
by Dr. Fleming, or caused by early childhood head trauma, 
both experts agreed that it was irreversibly present after age 
four. 
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extreme emotional distress at the time of the murder due to a 
combination of his disorders and his use of drugs and alcohol.  
Dr. Whyte similarly thought that the combination of 
intoxication and Blystone‘s disorders would have resulted in 
extreme mental disturbance.  Nonetheless, both experts also 
agreed that, as evidenced by his institutional records, 
Blystone would not pose a future danger to society if he were 
to spend the rest of his life in a highly structured 
environment, such as prison.   
 
Finally, Blystone introduced three types of institutional 
records, each of which contained potentially significant 
mitigating evidence, and each of which was available at the 
time of trial.    
 
Blystone‘s Navy records indicate that he received an 
unsuitable discharge primarily because of ―[a]pathy and 
defective attitudes.‖  App. 1495.  The records further indicate 
that ―due to the nature of SMSR Blystone‘s past service and 
the severity of his present personality disorder, it was the 
Commandant‘s opinion that further retention would not have 
been in the best interests of the Navy.‖  App. 1494.  His Navy 
records reflect a number of problems with his service, such as 
frequent unauthorized absences and mediocre performance.  
He received a low mark in ―[a]daptability‖ because he needed 
―to strengthen his relationship with his superiors and be more 
conscientious of his military responsibilities.‖  App. 1496.  
Lastly, the Navy records indicate that he had a burn scar on 
his right forearm, as well as a gunshot wound on his anterior 
elbow, and that he had been hospitalized once in connection 
with an injury near his right eyebrow.  Though Whiteko knew 
that Blystone served in the Navy, he made no effort to obtain 
these records and, thus, never followed up on their contents. 
17 
 
 
Blystone also introduced his Maryland Department of 
Correction Records (―prison records‖), which reflect that he 
received a ten year sentence for robbery in 1979.  The prison 
records consist of both a medical and an administrative 
section.  The medical section of the records indicates that 
Blystone saw medical personnel frequently from 1980 to 
1982, with complaints of fainting, headaches, and vision 
problems.
6
  It also references the scars on his arms, which are 
suggestive of self-mutilation.  The administrative section of 
the prison records indicates that Blystone exhibited excellent 
institutional adjustment and that he had no violent episodes 
while incarcerated.  Moreover, Blystone‘s work supervisor 
recommended him for parole after he completed less than 
three years of his sentence because of his superior 
performance in the prison workforce.  
 
 Finally, Blystone introduced the competency 
evaluation conducted prior to trial by Mayview State 
Hospital.  As indicated by Drs. Fleming and Whyte, the 
evaluation, though brief, contains psychologically significant 
information, which arguably should have led Whiteko to 
investigate Blystone‘s mental health further for mitigation 
purposes.  The evaluation indicates that Blystone has an I.Q. 
score placing him in the superior range of intellectual 
functioning.  But it also reflects that he has ―anger related to 
authority figures that is well-entrenched and stems from deep-
rooted problems in his familial relationships.  He has a high 
energy level and strong need for immediate gratification.‖  
App. 1490.  Other test results conducted as part of the 
                                              
6
 Dr. Whyte testified that these physical symptoms are 
indicative of organic brain damage. 
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competency evaluation indicate that Blystone periodically 
suffered from low self-esteem, possessed significant ―acting-
out potential,‖ had unfulfilled needs for attention, and had 
marked antisocial ideation.    
 
Both Dr. Fleming and Dr. Whyte agreed that a 
competency evaluation, particularly one as ―disappointingly 
brief,‖ App. 1357, as the Mayview Report, is of an entirely 
different nature than a mitigation evaluation.  
Notwithstanding its brevity, however, both doctors also 
agreed that the competency evaluation, which counsel had 
possession of prior to trial, included clinically significant ―red 
flags‖ that required follow-up with regard to mitigation.  
They also agreed that all of the tools they used to diagnose 
Blystone were available at the time of trial and that a 
qualified expert would have reached the same diagnoses at 
that time.  Whiteko acknowledged at the PCRA hearing that 
he had read the competency evaluation, but had decided, 
without the assistance of an expert, that nothing in the report 
would be useful in developing a mitigation case.   
 
 After hearing this substantial body of evidence, the 
PCRA court denied Blystone‘s petition.  It was persuaded that 
Whiteko conducted a sufficient investigation into mitigating 
circumstances by reviewing all of the available discovery 
materials, including the Mayview Hospital competency 
evaluation, and interviewing members of Blystone‘s family.  
The PCRA court found it significant that neither Blystone nor 
his family members told Whiteko, when asked, about other 
potential witnesses that could provide mitigating evidence or 
indicated that Blystone had substance abuse issues.  Notably, 
the court found Norman Blystone‘s testimony that Whiteko 
never posed such questions to him to lack credibility because 
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it was inconsistent with his statement that he could not 
remember everything about Whiteko‘s interviews.  The 
PCRA court also discounted Sharon Smitley‘s testimony as to 
Blystone‘s substance use on the night of the homicide 
because she did not mention Blystone‘s intoxication when she 
testified at the 1985 hearing on his post-trial motions.    
 
The PCRA court further concluded that Whiteko could 
not be deemed ineffective for failing to employ mental health 
professionals to evaluate Blystone prior to sentencing because 
Blsytone had no constitutional right to such assistance, and 
any right that he may have had was protected by the court-
appointed doctors who had performed the competency 
evaluation.  It additionally found the testimony of Drs. 
Fleming and Whyte to be ―in large measure irrelevant,‖ 
because neither doctor knew Blystone at the time of the 
crimes, and their evaluations were performed long after the 
homicide occurred.  The PCRA court also stated that it could 
not find counsel ineffective for failing to pursue the purported 
―red flags‖ Drs. Fleming and Whyte found in the Mayview 
Hospital report because the Mayview doctors did not see 
them as ―red flags‖ for purposes of competency.  App. 1645.    
 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, 
stating that ―[t]he PCRA court determined that counsel 
conducted a proper investigation into all possible mitigating 
circumstances, and we find substantial support in the record 
to uphold [that] determination.‖  Commonwealth v. Blystone, 
725 A.2d 1197, 1206 (Pa. 1999) (―Blystone II‖).  It further 
found that Blystone could not succeed in an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim because he waived his right to 
present any mitigating evidence to the jury and, therefore, 
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could not demonstrate that his counsel‘s failures, if any, 
caused him prejudice.   
 
C. 
 
Blystone filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the District Court in 2000 
raising numerous constitutional challenges to his convictions 
and death sentence.  In a lengthy and thorough opinion issued 
March 31, 2005, the District Court denied relief on all guilt-
phase claims, but granted the writ as to the death sentence, 
concluding that the state court‘s denial of Blystone‘s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was objectively 
unreasonable.  Specifically, the District Court found that trial 
counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate, develop, or 
introduce expert mental health evidence and institutional 
records in mitigation, and that Blystone did not waive his 
right to present all mitigating evidence — at most, Blystone 
waived presentation of lay witness testimony.  The District 
Court thus held that, on the record presented to the state court, 
it was unreasonable to conclude that Blystone‘s waiver 
prevented him from demonstrating that prejudice resulted 
from counsel‘s deficiencies.  In addition, the District Court 
denied (but granted Blystone a Certificate of Appealability 
on) an additional claim for penalty-phase relief based on trial 
counsel‘s failure to investigate adequately and develop lay 
witness testimony in mitigation.
7
  
                                              
7
 The District Court took pains to note that Blystone raised 
serious questions about the state court‘s conclusions with 
regard to lay witness testimony, and indicated its belief that if 
Whiteko had obtained Blystone‘s institutional records and 
better understood the Mayview Hospital report, he would 
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 Blystone filed a timely motion to alter or amend the 
District Court‘s judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(e), claiming to have newly discovered evidence 
of prosecutorial misconduct relevant to three of his guilt 
phase claims.
8
  By way of this motion, Blystone asked the 
District Court to grant him leave to conduct discovery of the 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct, as well as a subsequent 
opportunity to amend his petition to add new claims, 
depending upon what the discovery might reveal.  Blystone 
asserted that the three prosecutors who handled his case, as 
well as the lead investigator, State Trooper Montgomery 
Goodwin, were central players in recent court proceedings 
                                                                                                     
have been able to conduct a more thorough investigation of 
the mitigating evidence available through lay witness 
testimony.  Though the District Court believed that the state 
court erred in rejecting this part of Blystone‘s claim, it could 
not find the state court‘s conclusion to be unreasonable.  
  
8
 These are:  Claim VII alleging that trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to pursue the issue of drug, alcohol, and 
mental impairment to reduce the degree of guilt to third-
degree murder; Claim XV alleging that the Commonwealth 
violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to 
disclose that its lead state police investigator had ―substantial 
doubts‖ about whether Blystone had committed a robbery, 
which also provided the sole alleged aggravating factor for 
his death sentence; and Claim XVI alleging that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate and present exculpatory 
testimony from George Powell concerning the alleged 
robbery, as well as evidence supporting guilt-stage defenses 
to murder. 
22 
 
that exposed a systematic practice of discovery abuses by the 
Fayette County District Attorney‘s office around the time of 
Blystone‘s trial.  These discovery abuses included 
withholding exculpatory evidence, making undisclosed deals 
with witnesses, and altering, redacting, or hiding witness 
statements favorable to the defense.  In support of this 
assertion, Blystone relied primarily upon an October 1, 2004 
decision of the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas in 
Commonwealth v. Munchinski, which granted the defendant 
a new trial based upon prosecutorial misconduct committed 
by the same prosecutors who had handled Blystone‘s case 
approximately two years earlier.  Blystone also obtained an 
affidavit, dated November 3, 2004, from Trooper Goodwin, 
then an inmate in state prison, stating that ―in cases in which I 
was lead investigator, documents were altered or changed 
before they were provided to defense counsel.‖  App. 634.  
Trooper Goodwin further stated that ―it [was] obvious to 
[him] that there were redactions and alterations‖ in Blystone‘s 
police records, though he declined to explain further for fear 
of hurting his chances at parole.  Id.  Finally, Blystone 
submitted the police records that he believed were redacted or 
altered, as well as the 1995 Affidavit of Gary Hendrix, the 
chief investigator for Blystone‘s post-conviction team, which 
stated that Miles Miller claimed to have been coerced by the 
police into wearing a wire to tape his conversation with 
Blystone, and that the District Attorney‘s office paid him to 
testify.   
 
 The District Court denied the Rule 59(e) motion to 
alter or amend judgment, finding that the evidence presented 
in support was not newly discovered; rather, Blystone had 
been in possession of all the information upon which he relied 
in the Rule 59(e) motion well before the District Court issued 
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its judgment on March 31, 2005.  The District Court thus 
concluded that Blystone‘s motion was dilatory.  Moreover, 
the District Court was persuaded that consideration of the 
purportedly new evidence would ultimately be futile to 
Blystone‘s case because the evidence of his guilt on the first-
degree murder and robbery convictions was overwhelming 
and nothing submitted in support of the Rule 59(e) motion 
convinced the District Court that it might amend its judgment 
as to guilt-phase relief. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.   We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.   
 
Presently before this court is Blystone‘s timely appeal 
from the final judgment and order denying his Rule 59(e) 
motion, as well as the Commonwealth‘s cross-appeal from 
the District Court‘s grant of penalty-phase relief.  This Court 
granted Blystone a Certificate of Appealability (―COA‖) as to 
two specific issues related to the District Court‘s denial of his 
Rule 59(e) motion.  First, we granted review as to whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying Claims VII, 
XV, and XVI, arising from the guilt phase of Blystone‘s trial, 
without first granting him discovery with regard to the alleged 
newly discovered evidence of prosecutorial misconduct.  
Second, we granted review to determine whether the District 
Court abused its discretion in denying Blystone‘s Rule 59(e) 
motion insofar as he sought permission to conduct discovery 
into alleged newly discovered evidence of prosecutorial 
misconduct and amend his habeas petition to raise previously 
unavailable Brady claims.  In essence, however, Blystone‘s 
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appeal requires us to answer only one fairly straightforward 
question:  did the District Court abuse its discretion in 
denying the Rule 59(e) motion?   
 
The Commonwealth‘s cross-appeal brings two 
additional issues before us.  First, we must determine whether 
the District Court erred in granting relief on Blystone‘s claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, 
develop, or introduce expert mental health testimony and 
institutional records in mitigation.  And, second, we must 
determine whether the District Court erred in denying relief 
on Blystone‘s claim that trial counsel was also ineffective for 
failing to investigate adequately and develop lay witness 
testimony in mitigation. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
 As an initial matter, we must ask whether the District 
Court had jurisdiction to pass on Blystone‘s Rule 59(e) 
motion, and whether we, in turn, have jurisdiction to review it 
on appeal.   
 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (―AEDPA‖), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996), places the federal courts of appeals in the role of 
―gate-keeper,‖ charging them with the responsibility of 
―preventing the repeated filing of habeas petitions that attack 
the prisoner‘s underlying conviction.‖  Leal Garcia v. 
Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2009).  Pursuant to 
this gate-keeping function, AEDPA instructs the courts of 
appeals to dismiss any claim presented in a second or 
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successive petition that the petitioner presented in a previous 
application.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).  If a petitioner 
presents a new claim in a second or successive habeas corpus 
application, we must also dismiss that claim unless one of two 
narrow exceptions applies: 
 
(A) the applicant shows that the claim 
relies on a new rule of constitutional law, 
made retroactive to cases on collateral 
review by the Supreme Court, that was 
previously unavailable; or 
 
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim 
could not have been discovered 
previously through the exercise of due 
diligence; and 
 
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if 
proven and viewed in light of the 
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient 
to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that, but for constitutional 
error, no reasonable factfinder would 
have found the applicant guilty of the 
underlying offense. 
 
Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B)(ii).  ―Before a second or successive 
application permitted by this section is filed in the district 
court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of 
appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider 
the application.‖  Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A).  A petitioner‘s failure 
to seek such authorization from the appropriate appellate 
court before filing a second or successive habeas petition 
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―acts as a jurisdictional bar.‖  United States v. Key, 205 F.3d 
773, 774 (5th Cir. 2000).  
 
Our sister Circuits have split on the issue of whether a 
Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment that raises a 
cognizable habeas claim is properly construed as a second or 
successive habeas petition.  If so considered, AEDPA 
required Blystone to seek this Court‘s authorization to file the 
motion before the District Court could properly entertain it 
and we are, therefore, without jurisdiction to review the 
District Court‘s disposition of the motion on appeal.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b); see also Gonzales v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 
529 (2005) (―Rule 60(b), like the rest of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, applies in habeas corpus proceedings . . . only ‗to 
the extent that [it is] not inconsistent with‘ applicable federal 
statutory provisions and rules.‖ (alteration in original and 
footnote omitted)).   
 
Our discussion of this issue necessarily begins with 
Gonzalez v. Crosby.  In Gonzales, the Supreme Court 
addressed the question of when a federal court should 
construe a petitioner‘s motion for relief from judgment 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) as a second or successive petition 
subject to the restrictions of AEDPA.  545 U.S. at 526.  
Noting that ―[a]s a textual matter, § 2244(b) applies only 
where the court acts pursuant to a prisoner‘s ‗application‘ for 
a writ of habeas corpus,‖ the Court began its analysis by 
stating that ―it is clear that for purposes of § 2244(b) an 
‗application‘ for habeas relief is a filing that contains one or 
more ‗claims.‘‖  Id. at 530 (quotation marks omitted).  The 
Court explained that ―[i]n some instances, a Rule 60(b) 
motion will contain one or more ‗claims,‘‖ and ―[a] habeas 
petitioner‘s filing that seeks vindication of such a claim is, if 
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not in substance a ‗habeas corpus application,‘ at least similar 
enough that failing to subject it to the same requirements 
would be ‗inconsistent with‘ the statute.‖  Id. at 530, 531.  
This must be so because  
 
[u]sing Rule 60(b) to present new claims 
for relief from a state court‘s judgment 
of conviction — even claims couched in 
the language of a true Rule 60(b) motion 
— circumvents AEDPA‘s requirement 
that a new claim be dismissed unless it 
relies on either a new rule of 
constitutional law or newly discovered 
facts. 
  
Id. at 531.  Accordingly, the Court held that a Rule 60(b) 
motion is subject to the restrictions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 
2244(b) when it advances one or more ―claims.‖9   
The Court also explained that ―when a Rule 60(b) 
motion attacks, not the substance of the federal court‘s 
resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the 
integrity of the federal habeas proceedings,‖ the motion is not 
properly construed as advancing a ―claim‖ and is, therefore, 
not a second or successive petition.   Id. at 532.  In light of 
this admonition, the Court went on to provide specific 
guidance as to when a Rule 60(b) motion advances a ―claim‖ 
for purposes of AEDPA.  Id. at 531-32.  For example, ―[a] 
motion that seeks to add a new ground for relief‖ advances a 
claim, as does a motion that ―attacks the federal court‘s 
                                              
9
 Prior to Gonzales, this Court held similarly with regard to 
Rule 60(b) motions in Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 727 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
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previous resolution of a claim on the merits,  since alleging 
that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is 
effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, 
under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to 
habeas relief.‖  Id. at 532 (footnote omitted).  Similarly, a 
motion that seeks to present newly discovered evidence in 
support of a claim previously denied presents a claim.  Id.   
 
Blystone‘s Rule 59(e) motion does not raise any new 
claims; rather, it seeks only discovery and a subsequent 
opportunity either to amend the petition to add new claims 
should they become available, or to present new evidence in 
support of three of his previously denied claims.  
Nonetheless, we are convinced that Blystone‘s Rule 59(e) 
motion is a habeas corpus petition within the meaning set 
forth in Gonzales.  As the Supreme Court explained, a motion 
―seek[ing] leave to present ‗newly discovered evidence‘ in 
support of a claim previously denied‖ advances a claim and 
is, therefore, a habeas corpus petition.  Id. at 531 (citation 
omitted).  And ―by taking steps that lead inexorably to a 
merits-based attack on the prior‖ judgment on his habeas 
petition, Post v. Bradshaw, 422 F.3d 419, 424-25 (6th Cir. 
2005), Blystone has made evident his purpose to seek 
vindication of previously denied claims through the 
presentation of new evidence.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
Blystone‘s Rule 59(e) motion advances a claim and is thus a 
habeas corpus petition. 
 
The pertinent question for our jurisdictional analysis, 
then, is whether a Rule 59(e) motion to amend or alter 
judgment is materially different from a Rule 60(b) motion to 
reconsider, such that it does not constitute a second or 
successive petition, even if it advances a claim.  We now join 
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the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in answering that 
question in the affirmative.   
 
As indicated above, Gonzales clearly delineated when 
a ―Rule 60(b) motion should be treated like a habeas corpus 
application.‖  Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 533.  Notably, however, 
even though ―it is well settled that the phrase [‗second or 
successive‘] does not simply ‗refe[r] to all [habeas] 
applications filed second or successively in time,‘‖ Magwood 
v. Patterson, 130 S. Ct. 2788, 2796 (2010) (second alteration 
in original), Gonzales did not explicitly address the 
subsequent question in the analytical chain — whether a Rule 
60(b) motion, which constitutes a habeas corpus petition, is 
properly treated as a second or successive one.  Instead, the 
Court effectively assumed that, if a Rule 60(b) motion 
constitutes a habeas corpus petition, it is necessarily second 
or successive and, therefore, subject to AEDPA‘s 
jurisdictional restrictions.  And the reason for such an 
assumption is rendered immediately evident by the operation 
of Rule 60(b):  Rule 60(b) only comes into play after the time 
to appeal has expired and the judgment has become final.  See 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 528.  Accordingly, a Rule 60(b) motion 
that raises a claim attacking the underlying criminal judgment 
must be a second or successive petition because, the judgment 
having become final, the petitioner has expended the ―one full 
opportunity to seek collateral review‖ that AEDPA ensures.  
Urinyi v. United States, 607 F.3d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(quotation marks omitted).  In other words, a Rule 60(b) 
motion is, in substance, both a collateral attack on the first 
habeas judgment and a new collateral attack on the 
underlying criminal judgment because Rule 60(b) does not 
prevent the original habeas judgment from becoming final; 
instead, it seeks to set aside the already final judgment.  See 
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Curry v. United States, 307 F.3d 664, 665 (7th Cir. 2002).  
This is not so in the case of a Rule 59(e) motion. 
 
Quite to the contrary, a timely Rule 59(e) motion 
suspends the finality of the judgment by tolling the time for 
appeal.
10
  See Howard v. United States, 533 F.3d 472, 475 
(6th Cir. 2008).   Accordingly, we cannot logically subject a 
Rule 59(e) motion to the statutory limitations imposed upon 
second or successive collateral attacks on criminal judgments 
because, unlike a Rule 60(b) motion, it is neither a collateral 
attack on the initial habeas judgment, nor a new collateral 
attack on the underlying criminal judgment — rather it is part 
and parcel of the petitioner‘s ―one full opportunity to seek 
collateral review.‖  Urinyi, 607 F.3d at 320 (quotation marks 
omitted); see Curry, 307 F.3d at 665.  It is for this reason that 
we agree with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that 
―[t]he purposes behind Rule 59(e), as well as the mechanics 
of its operation, counsel in favor of the nonapplicability of 
second-or-successive limitations,‖ even if the motion 
advances a claim.  Howard, 533 F.3d at 474.   
 
Rule 59(e) makes explicit that the district court may 
continue to exercise the inherent power that it has to rectify 
its own mistakes prior to the entry of judgment for a brief 
                                              
10
 We note, however, that a Rule 59(e) motion does not 
suspend the finality of a judgment for purposes of claim or 
issue preclusion.  See 18A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 4432 (2d ed. 2002) (―[I]t is clear that definitions of finality 
cannot automatically be carried over from appeals cases to 
preclusion problems.‖). 
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period of time immediately after judgment is entered.  See 
White v. N.H. Dep‘t of Emp‘t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450 
(1982).
11
  Viewed against this backdrop, we think it clear that 
applying AEDPA‘s limitations on successive collateral 
attacks to Rule 59(e) motions would unduly interfere with the 
prompt reconsideration of just-entered judgments.  That is to 
say, it would frustrate Rule 59(e)‘s intention to allow the 
district court to correct obvious errors in its reasoning readily, 
which in turn ―further[s] the important goal of avoiding 
piecemeal appellate review of judgments.‖  Osterneck v. 
Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 177 (1989).  We are 
unwilling to attribute to Congress the ―unlikely intent‖ to so 
impede Rule 59(e)‘s operation by way of AEDPA‘s ―second 
or successive‖ restrictions.  Howard, 533 F.3d at 475.   
 
We are cognizant of the fact that Howard was issued 
over a strong dissent, which concluded that, while Rule 59(e) 
motions that seek only ―to bring to the attention of a district 
judge errors[] . . . in the judge‘s decision on the case as it was 
put before him‖ should not be considered second or 
successive petitions, those based on wholly new claims 
cannot escape being ruled out by the basic premise of 
AEDPA ―that all habeas claims should generally be brought 
at one time.‖  Howard, 533 F.3d at 476 (Boggs, C.J., 
dissenting).  Following this reasoning, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit has concluded that, though technical 
differences exist between Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b), in 
practice the two rules ―permit the same relief — a change in 
                                              
11
 This power is entirely ―distinct from the power explicitly 
granted by Rule 60 to reopen cases well after final judgment 
has been entered.‖  In re Saffady, 524 F.3d 799, 803 (6th Cir. 
2008). 
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judgment,‖ and thus the Gonzales framework should apply 
equally to both types of motions.   Williams v. Thaler, 602 
F.3d 291, 303-04 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).
12
  
Following this logic, in Williams, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit opined that a Rule 59(e) motion that 
advances a claim constitutes a second or successive petition. 
 
We understand the temptation to apply the rule of 
Gonzales to those Rule 59(e) motions that assert ―wholly new 
claims,‖ Howard, 533 F.3d at 476 (Boggs, C.J., dissenting), 
since one could argue that such motions are, in effect, new 
petitions improperly captioned as motions to reconsider.  But 
we, nonetheless, disagree with the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit‘s holding because we do not believe that the 
differences between Rules 60(b) and 59(e) are merely 
technical.  To the contrary, as we explained above, we think it 
is clear that, unlike a Rule 60(b) motion, a Rule 59(e) motion 
is part of the one full opportunity for collateral review that 
AEDPA ensures to each petitioner.  And we are unwilling to 
suppose that Congress meant to deny the District Court the 
first opportunity to rework its newly issued judgment.  Thus, 
we are convinced that a ―Rule 59(e) motion, whether or not it 
should properly be denied on its merits, does not require a 
                                              
12
 In Williams, the court also cited Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 
925, 935 (8th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Pedraza, 466 
F.3d 932, 934 (10th Cir. 2006), as support for the conclusion 
that AEDPA‘s limitations on successive petitions apply to 
Rule 59(e) motions.  We do not believe that Ward and 
Pedraza are helpful, however, because they each concerned 
Rule 59(e) motions to reconsider the dismissal of  Rule 60(b) 
motions that the district court had determined to be second or 
successive petitions requiring court of appeals permission. 
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transfer to this court to determine whether the requirements of 
[AEDPA] are met.‖  Howard, 533 F.3d at 476.   
 
Accordingly, we now join the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit in holding that a timely Rule 59(e) motion to 
amend or alter a judgment is not a second or successive 
petition, whether or not it advances a claim, and therefore 
such a motion lies outside the reach of the jurisdictional 
limitations that AEDPA imposes upon multiple collateral 
attacks. 
 
B. 
 
 Having determined that the District Court properly 
exercised jurisdiction over Blystone‘s Rule 59(e) motion, we 
turn to the merits of Blystone‘s challenge to that ruling. We 
review the District Court‘s denial of a motion to alter or 
amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) for abuse of 
discretion, ―except over matters of law, which are subject to 
plenary review.‖  Cureton v. Nat‘l Collegiate Athletic Ass‘n, 
252 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 2001).   
The scope of a motion for reconsideration, we have 
held, is extremely limited.  Such motions are not to be used as 
an opportunity to relitigate the case; rather, they may be used 
only to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present 
newly discovered evidence.  Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. 
v. Dentsply Int‘l Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010).  
―Accordingly, a judgment may be altered or amended [only] 
if the party seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the 
following grounds:  (1) an intervening change in the 
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was 
not available when the court granted the motion for summary 
judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact 
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or to prevent manifest injustice.‖  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted) (emphasis added).  We have made clear that ―‗new 
evidence,‘ for reconsideration purposes, does not refer to 
evidence that a party . . . submits to the court after an adverse 
ruling.  Rather, new evidence in this context means evidence 
that a party could not earlier submit to the court because that 
evidence was not previously available.‖  Id. at 252.  Evidence 
that is not newly discovered, as so defined, cannot provide the 
basis for a successful motion for reconsideration.  Harsco 
Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
 The District Court denied Blystone‘s Rule 59(e) 
motion, finding that the evidence submitted in support was 
not in fact newly discovered, since Blystone had possession 
of it many months before the District Court denied habeas 
relief.
13
  This was plainly not an abuse of discretion under our 
clearly articulated standards for the assessment of a motion 
for reconsideration.  See Howard Hess Dental Labs., 602 F.3d 
at 251-52; see also Howard, 533 F.3d at 475 (explaining in 
the context of a habeas action that ―Rule 59(e) motions 
cannot be used to present new arguments that could have 
                                              
13
 The District Court found, in the alternative, that the new 
evidence would have no impact on its judgment as to 
Blystone‘s guilt phase claims because the evidence of his 
guilt was overwhelming.  This alternative basis was neither 
essential to the District Court‘s denial of the Rule 59(e) 
motion, nor is it necessary to our review. 
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been raised prior to judgment‖).  We, therefore, decline to 
upset the District Court‘s ruling.14   
                                              
14
 Blystone makes three other arguments in favor of reversing 
the District Court‘s denial of his Rule 59(e) motion, each of 
which is without merit.   
First, relying on Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 
869 (3d Cir. 1984), he contends that his Rule 59(e) motion 
was effectively a motion for leave to amend his habeas 
petition, and that the District Court should have applied the 
liberal standard used to assess a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(a).  In Adams, the district court denied the plaintiffs‘ Rule 
59(e) and Rule 15 motions, which were filed after we directed 
the entry of a judgment against the plaintiffs in a § 1292(b) 
interlocutory appeal.  In holding that the district court abused 
its discretion by denying relief, we stated that the rationale 
underlying most cases rejecting post-judgment amendments 
— that the plaintiff should have raised the new theory before 
trial — did not apply where only an interlocutory judgment 
had issued.  Id. at 868.  This case is distinct from Adams in 
two important respects.  First, Blystone did not file a motion 
seeking to amend his petition; rather, he sought leave to 
conduct discovery and additional time thereafter in which to 
move to amend.  The District Court, therefore, had no motion 
to amend before it, and did not err in failing to treat the 
motion for reconsideration as something it was not.  Second, 
unlike in Adams, the rationale that generally underlies the 
denial of post-judgment amendments indeed applies here:  
Blystone should have sought leave for discovery before the 
District Court adjudicated the petition, given that the ―new‖ 
evidence was available to him before such judgment was 
issued. 
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IV. 
 
 We next turn to the District Court‘s grant of penalty-
phase relief. 
 
A. 
Because the District Court did not conduct an 
evidentiary hearing before ruling on the habeas petition, our 
review is plenary and we conduct our analysis as the District 
Court did.  Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 50 (3d Cir. 
2002).  The state court adjudicated Blystone‘s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim on the merits;
15
 thus, our review is 
                                                                                                     
Second, relying on Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 
(1997), Blystone argues that the District Court erred in 
denying the Rule 59(e) motion because he set forth sufficient 
facts to warrant discovery.  Even if Blystone indeed set forth 
evidence sufficient to warrant discovery had he presented it 
while his petition was pending, that is a different question 
than the one before this court — namely, whether the District 
Court erred in finding that the motion for discovery was 
dilatory because the evidence presented in support of the Rule 
59(e) motion was not newly discovered. 
Third, Blystone contends that the District Court abused 
its discretion because, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), 
he had a year from the date on which the ―new‖ evidence 
could have been discovered through the exercise of due 
diligence to raise claims thereon.  Again, this is a different 
question than whether the District Court erred in denying the 
Rule 59(e) motion.   
 
15
 Where a lower state court opinion ―represents the state 
courts‘ last reasoned opinion on [the relevant issue],‖ we 
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limited by the mandates of AEDPA.  See Adamson v. Cathel, 
633 F.3d 248, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2011).  As the Supreme Court 
has made clear, AEDPA imposes a ―highly deferential 
standard for evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that 
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.‖  
Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted).   Accordingly, under AEDPA, our 
task is only to determine whether the state court‘s 
adjudication of Blystone‘s Strickland claim: 
 
(1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal Law, 
as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States; or 
 
(2) resulted in a decision that was 
based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light 
of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).   
                                                                                                     
―look through‖ the higher state court-opinion and apply § 
2254(d)‘s standards to the ―highest reasoned opinion.‖  Bond 
v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289-90 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation 
omitted).   Because the PCRA court presented a much more 
thoroughly reasoned decision than the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court on some of the issues involved, we will, at times, 
analyze the PCRA court‘s decision, on which the Supreme 
Court decision heavily relied. 
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 Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, we read § 
2254(d) to require three distinct legal inquiries.  See, e.g., 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011).  First, we 
―must inquire whether the state court decision was ‗contrary 
to‘ clearly established federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States; second, if it was not, 
[we] must evaluate whether the state court judgment rests 
upon an objectively unreasonable application of clearly 
established Supreme Court jurisprudence.‖  Matteo v. 
Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(en banc).  Third, we must ask whether the state court 
decision ―was based on an unreasonable determination of the 
facts in light of the evidence presented‖ to the state court.  28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).   
 
As the Supreme Court has explained, a decision by a 
state court is contrary to clearly established law if it applies a 
rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in the Court‘s 
cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially 
indistinguishable from a decision of the Court and 
nevertheless arrives at a result different from the Court‘s 
precedent.  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 
(2000).   
 
A state court decision is objectively unreasonable ―if 
the state court identifies the correct governing principle from 
th[e Supreme] Court‘s decision [] but unreasonably applies 
that principle to the facts of the prisoner‘s case.‖  Id. at 413.  
Under this standard, ―[a] federal habeas court may not issue 
the writ simply because that court concludes in its 
independent judgment that the state-court decision applied a 
Supreme Court case incorrectly.  Rather, it is the habeas 
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applicant‘s burden to show that the state court applied that 
case to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable 
manner.‖  Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 641 (2003) 
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).  In other 
words, ―[a] state court‘s determination that a claim lacks 
merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‗fairminded 
jurists could disagree‘ on the correctness of the state court‘s 
decision.‖  Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (quoting Yarborough 
v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).  And ―the more 
general the rule at issue — and thus the greater the potential 
for reasoned disagreement among fair-minded judges — the 
more leeway state courts have in reaching outcomes in case-
by-case determinations.‖  Renico, 130 S. Ct. at 1864 
(quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 
With regard to § 2254(d)(2), this Court has explained 
that ―a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and 
based on a factual determination will not be overturned on 
factual grounds unless [the state court‘s findings of fact are] 
objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in 
the state-court proceeding.‖  Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 
210, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted).  ―State-
court factual findings, moreover, are presumed correct; the 
petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by 
‗clear and convincing evidence.‘‖  Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 
333, 338-339 (2006) (quoting § 2254(e)(1)); see also 
Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009) (―Under 
the § 2254 standard, a district court is bound to presume that 
the state court‘s factual findings are correct, with the burden 
on the petitioner to rebut those findings by clear and 
convincing evidence.‖).  The evidence against which a federal 
court measures the reasonableness of the state court‘s factual 
findings is the record evidence at the time of the state court‘s 
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adjudication.  Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1401 
(2011). 
 
As there is no dispute that the state court applied the 
correct principle of law to adjudicate Blystone‘s claim, we 
may only overturn the state court‘s decision if it was 
objectively unreasonable. 
 
B. 
 
Blystone first contends that the state court‘s denial of 
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as it relates to 
counsel‘s failure to investigate and develop expert mental 
health testimony and institutional records in mitigation, was 
unreasonable in light of clearly established Supreme Court 
precedent, and was made in reliance upon unreasonable 
determinations of the facts.  The District Court agreed and 
vacated Blystone‘s death sentence on that basis.  We, too, 
agree and will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
We evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
using the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  To succeed on such a 
claim, the petitioner must demonstrate (1) that counsel‘s 
performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, and (2) that the petitioner suffered 
prejudice as a result of the deficiency.  Id. at 687.  To 
establish prejudice the petitioner ―must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
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A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.‖  Id. at 694.16   
 
―Surmounting Strickland‘s high bar is never an easy 
task.‖  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).  
―[U]nder de novo review, the standard for judging counsel‘s 
representation is a most deferential one,‖  Harrington, 131 S. 
Ct. at 788, and 
 
[e]stablishing that a state court‘s 
application of Strickland was 
unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the 
more difficult.  The standards created by 
Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly 
deferential, and when the two apply in 
tandem, review is doubly so. The 
Strickland standard is a general one, so 
the range of reasonable applications is 
substantial.  Federal habeas courts must 
guard against the danger of equating 
                                              
16
 The Commonwealth argues that Blystone‘s claim for relief 
depends on this Court‘s willingness to recognize a new rule 
— namely, that the principles of Strickland impose upon 
counsel an obligation to refuse the instructions of a competent 
client with respect to the presentation of mitigating evidence.  
But Blystone advocates no such new rule; rather, Blystone 
argues merely that counsel failed in his predicate duty to 
investigate, and advise Blystone of, available mitigating 
evidence prior to sentencing, and that he was prejudiced 
thereby.  The merits of such a claim are ―squarely governed‖ 
by Strickland.  Williams, 529 U.S. at 390. 
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unreasonableness under Strickland with 
unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When 
§ 2254(d) applies, the question is not 
whether counsel‘s actions were 
reasonable. The question is whether there 
is any reasonable argument that counsel 
satisfied Strickland‘s deferential 
standard. 
 
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
17
   
 
1. 
We first turn to the state court‘s interpretation and 
application of Strickland‘s performance prong.  Blystone 
argued unsuccessfully in state court that counsel was deficient 
in failing to investigate adequately and develop expert mental 
health testimony and institutional records in mitigation at the 
sentencing phase.  For the reasons set forth below, we can 
discern no reasonable argument to sustain the state court‘s 
                                              
17
 Though application of the Strickland test requires a case-
specific examination of the evidence, this ―obviates neither 
the clarity of the rule nor the extent to which the rule must be 
seen as ‗established‘ by [the Supreme Court.]‖  Williams, 529 
U.S. at 391.  Supreme Court decisions since the issuance of 
Strickland have shed further light on precisely what is 
required of counsel in conducting a sufficient investigation 
prior to sentencing.  But such a duty to investigate is certainly 
encompassed in the mandate of Strickland and has, therefore, 
been ―established‖ for purposes of AEDPA since the issuance 
of that decision.  See Marshall, 307 F.3d at 99-107. 
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conclusion that Blystone‘s lawyer satisfied Strickland‘s 
deferential standard.   
 
Unquestionably, investigation is essential to the 
lawyer‘s duties as both advisor and advocate.  See 1 ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1980).
18
  After 
all, ―[t]he effectiveness of advocacy is not to be measured 
solely by what the lawyer does at the trial; without careful 
preparation, the lawyer cannot fulfill the advocate‘s role.‖  Id.  
Indeed, the ―right to present, and to have the sentencer 
consider, any and all mitigating evidence means little if 
defense counsel fails to look for mitigating evidence‖ in the 
first instance.  Hendricks, 307 F.3d at 99 (quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
―[C]ounsel‘s general duty to investigate takes on 
supreme importance to a defendant in the context of 
developing mitigating evidence to present to a judge or jury 
considering the sentence of death.‖  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted).  ―The lawyer . . . has a substantial and important 
role to perform in raising mitigating factors both to the 
prosecutor initially and to the court at sentencing.‖  1 ABA 
Standards, supra, 4-4.1.  And this formidable task ―cannot 
effectively be done on the basis of broad general emotional 
appeals or on the strength of statements made to the lawyer 
by the defendant.‖  Id.    Rather, the lawyer must make 
sufficient ―efforts to discover all reasonably available 
                                              
18
 As the Supreme Court noted in Wiggins v. Smith, ―we long 
have referred [to ABA standards] as guides to determining 
what is reasonable.‖  539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (quotation 
marks omitted).  
 
44 
 
mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating 
evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.‖  
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (quotation marks omitted).  
―Information concerning the defendant‘s background, 
education, employment record, mental and emotional 
stability, family relationships, and the like, will be relevant. . . 
.‖  1 ABA Standards, supra, 4-4.1.   
 
Of course, while much is expected of trial counsel, 
Strickland also calls for great deference to an attorney‘s 
tactical decision to forego particular lines of investigation.  
And those strategic choices that counsel makes after 
conducting a thorough investigation of the relevant law and 
facts ―are virtually unchallengeable[.]‖  Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quotation marks omitted).  This 
does not mean, however, that counsel can insulate his 
decisions from review merely by calling them strategic, for 
―choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable [only] to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation.‖  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  That is to say, ―counsel has a duty 
to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.‖  
Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 
Importantly for our present purposes, this duty to 
conduct a reasonable investigation of mitigating evidence 
exists independently of counsel‘s duty to present a mitigation 
case to the jury.  In fact, the former is a necessary predicate to 
the latter:  if counsel has failed to conduct a reasonable 
investigation to prepare for sentencing, then he cannot 
possibly be said to have made a reasonable decision as to 
what to present at sentencing.  As such, ―our principal 
45 
 
concern in deciding whether [counsel] exercised ‗reasonable 
professional judgment‘ is not whether counsel should have 
presented a mitigation case.  Rather, we focus on whether the 
investigation supporting counsel‘s decision not to introduce 
mitigating evidence of [the defendant‘s] background was 
itself reasonable.‖   Id. at 522-23 (citation and brackets 
omitted).
 
 
 
We need not delve too deeply into the question of 
whether Whiteko‘s investigation prior to sentencing was 
deficient because the Commonwealth‘s brief all but concedes 
that it was.  See Commonwealth‘s Reply Br. 10 (―If counsel 
had persuaded petitioner not to contest the imposition of a 
sentence of death, then [Supreme Court precedent] would 
require an evaluation of whether counsel‘s inadequate 
investigation tainted his instructions and advice to his client.‖ 
(emphasis added)).  And, for the reasons that follow, we are 
persuaded that no reasonable argument can be made to 
support the state court‘s decision to the contrary.   
 
Notably, the Commonwealth does not dispute that the 
expert mental health testimony and institutional records 
presented at the PCRA hearing amount to constitutionally 
significant mitigating evidence.  Nor does the Commonwealth 
dispute that all of this evidence was readily available to 
Whiteko at the time of trial, had he looked for it.  Thus, the 
question before us is simply whether any reasonable 
argument can be made to support the conclusion that 
counsel‘s failure to explore these sources of mitigating 
evidence was not constitutionally deficient.   
 
The PCRA court determined that trial counsel‘s 
investigation into expert mental health evidence was adequate 
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because Blystone underwent a competency evaluation at the 
Mayview Hospital prior to trial and nothing in the resulting 
report would have suggested to counsel that he should inquire 
further into Blystone‘s mental health.  We disagree.  Indeed, 
we believe the state court‘s conclusion in this regard was 
objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in 
the proceedings before it.   
 
As the District Court aptly noted, ―[i]t is beyond cavil 
that the scope of an evaluation for purposes of mitigation at a 
capital sentencing proceeding is far broader than that for 
competency at trial.‖  District Court Op. 105 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 738 n.24 (Pa. 
2000); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1503 (11th Cir. 
1991)).  Thus, the fact that the Mayview Hospital report 
found Blystone competent to stand trial plainly does not, as 
the PCRA court‘s opinion suggests, lead inexorably to the 
conclusion that the report gave Blystone a clean bill of mental 
health for purposes of mitigation.  In fact, the record before 
the PCRA court demonstrated quite the opposite.  Drs. 
Fleming and Whyte testified that the Mayview Hospital 
competency evaluation contained clinically significant ―red 
flags,‖ which a qualified expert would have found to require 
follow-up prior to sentencing.  But counsel never even 
presented the competency evaluation to an expert, instead 
determining of his own accord that nothing in the report 
suggested that Blystone suffered from a mental illness.  
Notably, nothing was presented to the PCRA court that could 
have served to undermine the conclusion of Drs. Fleming and 
Whyte that any qualified expert would have found the 
contents of the Mayview Hospital report to be clinically 
significant.  On such a record, we conclude that the state 
court‘s assertion that the Mayview Hospital report contained 
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no indications of mental illness was an unreasonable 
determination of the facts. 
 
The state court‘s decision was similarly unreasonable 
in reaching the concomitant conclusion that counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to solicit an independent mental health 
evaluation because Blystone had no constitutional right to 
such an evaluation prior to sentencing.  Drs. Fleming and 
Whyte testified that, had the appropriate follow-up 
investigation of the Mayview Hospital report been conducted, 
a qualified expert would have had all of the means necessary 
at the time of trial to diagnose Blystone with organic brain 
syndrome caused by a childhood head injury, bipolar 
disorder, and borderline personality disorder.  Both doctors 
believed that the psychological conditions from which 
Blystone suffered rendered him substantially impaired at the 
time of the crime and they were of the opinion that a qualified 
expert would have reached the same conclusion prior to 
sentencing.   Again, nothing was presented to the PCRA court 
to undermine the opinions of Drs. Fleming and Whyte in this 
regard.
19
  Even assuming that the state court correctly 
concluded that Blystone had no constitutional right to an 
independent mental health evaluation prior to sentencing, it 
was certainly within the trial court‘s discretion to appoint an 
                                              
19
 The state court dismissed the opinions of Drs. Fleming and 
Whyte because they did not know Blystone at the time of the 
offense or at the time of trial.  In so doing, the state court 
ignored the fact that both doctors testified that all of the 
materials upon which they relied were available at the time of 
trial and that qualified experts would have reached the same 
diagnoses at that time. 
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expert had counsel so requested.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Miller, 746 A.2d 592, 605 (Pa. 2000) (Saylor, J., concurring).  
We believe it clear that competent counsel would have so 
requested under the circumstances.  Cf. Everett v. Beard, 290 
F.3d 500, 509 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that a ―reasonably 
competent attorney patently is required to know the state of 
the applicable law‖).  The state court‘s suggestion to the 
contrary is unreasonable.   
 
Counsel sought to justify further his failure to seek an 
expert mental health evaluation by explaining to the PCRA 
court that Blystone wanted ―all or nothing‖ — in other words, 
he believed his client wanted only to contest his guilt at trial 
and did not want to present a mitigation case if convicted.
20
  
This proffered justification, however, relies on an illogical 
leap:  the fact that Blystone rejected a plea deal offering him 
life in prison in exchange for an admission of guilt in no way 
compels the conclusion that he wanted to die if convicted.  
And, in any event, ―[t]he investigation for preparation of the 
sentencing phase should be conducted regardless of any 
initial assertion by the client that mitigation is not to be 
offered.‖  ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and 
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 
11.4.1(C).  Counsel cannot avoid the consequences of his 
inadequate preparation simply by virtue of the serendipitous 
occurrence that, on the day of sentencing, his client stuck 
with the decision not to go forward with a mitigation case.
 21
   
                                              
20
 Counsel did not defend his decision not to obtain the 
institutional records before the PCRA court. 
21
 We certainly recognize that  
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With regard to institutional records, we start with the 
fact that counsel knew prior to sentencing that Blystone had 
served in the Navy and been incarcerated in Maryland for 
robbery.  Yet, counsel failed even to attempt to acquire 
records from either institution.  The Commonwealth correctly 
points out that these records contain some information that 
may have proven unfavorable to Blystone.  But they also 
                                                                                                     
[t]he reasonableness of counsel‘s actions 
may be determined or substantially 
influenced by the defendant‘s own 
statements or actions. . . . And when a 
defendant has given counsel reason to 
believe that pursuing certain 
investigations would be fruitless or even 
harmful, counsel‘s failure to pursue those 
investigations may not later be 
challenged as unreasonable.   
 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  Still, notwithstanding any 
statements a defendant may make as to his desire to present a 
case in mitigation at sentencing, the duty to, at the very least, 
―explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to . . . the 
penalty‖ before sentencing belongs to the lawyer and ―exists 
regardless of the accused‘s admissions or statements to the 
lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the accused‘s stated desire 
to plead guilty.‖  1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 
(2d ed. 1982 Supp.).  After all, counsel also has a duty to 
provide advice upon which his client can make an informed 
decision not to present evidence in mitigation.  And counsel 
cannot fulfill this duty without first knowing what mitigating 
circumstances may exist.  See Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 
482, 492 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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contain evidence that plainly corroborates the testimony of 
Drs. Fleming and Whyte as to Blystone‘s personality disorder 
and childhood head injury.  Any amount of substantive 
engagement with this evidence would have spurred competent 
counsel to further investigate Blystone‘s mental health.  As 
Supreme Court precedent makes clear, defense counsel has a 
duty to obtain administrative records, such as those at issue 
here, as part of the ―obligation to conduct a thorough 
investigation of the defendant‘s background.‖  Williams, 529 
U.S. at 396 (citing 1 ABA Standards, supra, commentary, p. 
4-55).  We think it abundantly clear that trial counsel fell 
short of professional standards in failing to explore 
institutional records in the course of investigating Blystone‘s 
background in this case.  The state court‘s conclusion to the 
contrary reflects an unreasonable application of clearly 
established federal law.  See, e.g., Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527-
28 (finding state court‘s conclusion that counsel performed 
adequately, even though he did not fully explore known 
institutional records, to be objectively unreasonable). 
 
Moreover, counsel‘s inadequate investigation was 
clearly not the result of the type of reasoned tactical decision 
to which we owe deference under Strickland.  Indeed, 
counsel‘s testimony at the PCRA hearing makes evident that 
he did not even perform an investigation sufficient to provide 
the foundation for a reasoned strategic choice as to which 
avenues of potentially mitigating evidence to pursue.  See 
United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(―[C]ounsel can hardly be said to have made a strategic 
choice against pursuing a certain line of investigation when 
s/he has not yet obtained the facts on which such a decision 
could be made.‖). 
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We recognize that ―[t]he right to counsel does not 
require that a criminal defense attorney leave no stone and no 
witness unpursued.‖  Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 308 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).  
But the Sixth Amendment at least ―require[s] a reasoned 
judgment as to the amount of investigation the particular 
circumstances of a given case require.‖  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  It is evident 
from the PCRA record that counsel‘s limited investigation 
was not the result of any such reasoned judgment, but was 
merely the consequence of lackluster performance.  In other 
words, we think that ―counsel chose to abandon the[] 
investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully 
informed decision with respect to sentencing strategy 
impossible.‖  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527-28.  And we are 
convinced that there could be no disagreement among 
―fairminded jurists‖ that the state court‘s decision to the 
contrary was incorrect.   Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (―[A] 
state court‘s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 
federal habeas relief so long as ‗fairminded jurists could 
disagree‘ on the correctness of the state court‘s decision.‖ 
(quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664)).   
 
2. 
 
Having largely conceded that Whiteko‘s performance 
was deficient, the Commonwealth focuses its attention on the 
prejudice prong of the Strickland test.  The Commonwealth 
argues, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found, that 
Blystone made a ―knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,‖ 
waiver of his right to present any mitigating evidence at 
sentencing.  Blystone II, 725 A.2d at 1205 (noting that 
Blystone ―not only refused to take the stand to testify in 
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mitigation, but he also refused to allow any other mitigating 
evidence to be presented in his behalf‖).  Accordingly, the 
argument continues, Blystone has ―failed to demonstrate how 
counsel‘s alleged ineffectiveness prejudiced him‖ because the 
jury would not have been privy to any additional evidence 
that Whiteko may have uncovered through an adequate 
investigation.  Id. at 1205 n.20.  More specifically, the 
Commonwealth contends that the relief Blystone seeks is 
foreclosed by the Supreme Court‘s decision in Schriro v. 
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007), in which the petitioner, 
Landrigan, made a similar ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim based upon an allegedly deficient investigation.  A 
summary of Schriro and its progeny will be of use in 
explaining why we do not agree that Schriro controls our 
analysis of this case. 
 
  In Schriro, the Supreme Court confronted for the first 
time ―a situation in which a client interferes with counsel‘s 
efforts to present mitigating evidence to a sentencing court.‖  
Id. at 478.  Though Landrigan‘s counsel had advised his 
client ―very strongly‖ to allow the presentation of a mitigation 
case, Landrigan made clear upon questioning from the 
sentencing judge that he had instructed his counsel, in no 
uncertain terms, not to present any mitigating evidence.  Id. at 
469.  Indeed, while Landrigan‘s counsel was proffering to the 
court the mitigating evidence he would have presented, if so 
permitted by his client, Landrigan went as far as to interrupt 
multiple times to explain away the mitigating characteristics 
of the evidence, and to reaffirm that he did not want the 
evidence presented in court.  Id. at 470.  Moreover, Landrigan 
made it abundantly clear that he understood the consequences 
of his choice not to present a mitigation case:  at the end of 
the sentencing hearing, he explicitly asked the jury to impose 
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a death sentence, stating ―I think if you want to give me the 
death penalty, just bring it right on.  I‘m ready for it.‖  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  Applying AEDPA‘s deferential 
standard of review to these facts, the Supreme Court 
determined that the state court reasonably concluded that 
Landrigan had refused to allow the presentation of any 
mitigating evidence, regardless of its form, and that this 
refusal prevented him from thereafter demonstrating that 
counsel‘s allegedly inadequate investigation resulted in 
prejudice because no additional mitigating evidence would 
have come before the jury.  Id. at 475-77. 
 
We found Schriro to be controlling in Taylor v. Horn, 
504 F.3d 416 (3d. Cir. 2007).  In Taylor, the petitioner wrote 
a confession letter to the police, in which he stated, ―I want 
the maximum sentence.‖  Id. at 421 (quotation marks 
omitted).  At his change of plea hearing, the petitioner 
confirmed that he had instructed his attorney not to contact 
any witnesses or to call medical personnel who could testify 
on his behalf, and that he understood that ―the likely result 
will be imposition of the death penalty.‖  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted).  At sentencing, the petitioner informed the court that 
he declined to present any mitigating evidence and the court 
sentenced him to death.  Id. at 422.  Despite his dogged 
opposition to the presentation of mitigating evidence, the 
petitioner filed an ineffective assistance claim in subsequent 
state post-conviction proceedings based on his counsel‘s 
allegedly deficient investigation in preparation for sentencing.  
The state court denied the claim, finding that the petitioner 
could not make the necessary showing of prejudice, since he 
unwaveringly refused to allow his attorney to present any 
evidence in mitigation, going so far as to personally call 
potential witnesses to instruct them not to attend his 
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sentencing.  Id. at 424.  Applying AEDPA‘s deferential 
standard of review, we determined in Taylor that the state 
court‘s assessment of the facts was reasonable.  Id. at 452, 
455.  Though the petitioner in that case ―was not belligerent 
and obstructive in court like the defendant in [Schriro],‖ we 
were persuaded by the record ―that his determination not to 
present mitigating evidence was just as strong.‖  Id. at 455.  
As a result, we found that ―whatever counsel could have 
uncovered, [the petitioner] would not have permitted any 
witnesses to testify, and was therefore not prejudiced by any 
inadequacy in counsel‘s investigation or decision not to 
present mitigation evidence.‖  Id.  
 
In the subsequent case of Thomas v. Horn, the 
Commonwealth relied on Schriro and Taylor to argue that, 
even assuming that effective counsel would have discovered 
Thomas‘s history of mental illness prior to sentencing, no 
prejudice could have resulted from the inadequate 
investigation because Thomas would have prevented his 
counsel from presenting any evidence of his mental illness at 
sentencing.  570 F.3d 105, 126 (3d Cir. 2009).  We rejected 
this argument,
22
 holding that we could not conclude on the 
record before us that Thomas would have interfered with the 
presentation of all mitigating evidence, regardless of its form.  
Id.  We explained that Thomas‘s colloquy at sentencing 
focused narrowly on whether he wanted to take the stand 
himself, and did not provide a reasonable basis to conclude, 
as a factual matter, that he would have refused to present all 
                                              
22
 Unlike in Schriro and Taylor, our review in Thomas was 
not restricted by AEDPA because the state courts had not 
addressed Thomas‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
on the merits.  Thomas, 570 F.3d at 127.  
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other forms of mitigating evidence as well, had his attorney 
been prepared to do so.  Id. at 128.  Although we 
acknowledged that the sentencing court had asked Thomas to 
confirm that it was his decision not to present ―any evidence,‖ 
we noted that this question was part of a compound question 
that simultaneously asked Thomas to reaffirm that he did not 
wish to take the stand in his own behalf.  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted).  We were convinced that Thomas‘s ―terse answer to 
[the sentencing court‘s compound] inquiry does not display 
an intent to interfere with the presentation of mitigating 
evidence that is strong enough to preclude a showing of 
prejudice.‖  Id.  We similarly concluded that Thomas‘s 
response in the negative to the court‘s question as to whether 
he had any witnesses to call did not demonstrate that Thomas 
would have prevented the presentation of mitigating evidence 
in the form of expert testimony or records.  Id. 
 
The Commonwealth suggests that, like in Schriro and 
Taylor, Blystone‘s colloquy with the trial court provides 
indisputable support for the notion that Blystone would have 
refused to allow Whiteko to present any mitigating evidence 
on his behalf — including expert mental health testimony and 
institutional records — and thereby eliminates the possibility 
that prejudice might have resulted from Whiteko‘s deficient 
investigation.  To this end, the Commonwealth places much 
stock in Blystone‘s answer in the negative to the question 
―Do you wish to testify yourself or to have your parents 
testify or to offer any other evidence in this case?‖  App. 970 
(emphasis added).  The fact that Blystone declined to ―offer 
any other evidence,‖ the argument goes, is the beginning and 
the end of the prejudice inquiry.  We are not so persuaded. 
 
The trial court‘s colloquy in this case focused almost 
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entirely on whether Blystone wished to take the stand himself 
or have his parents testify on his behalf.  The colloquy was 
narrowly focused in this manner for an obvious reason:  the 
testimony of Blystone and his parents was the only evidence 
that Whiteko was prepared to present.  As in Thomas, the 
inquiry upon which the Commonwealth relies was part of a 
compound question that also asked Blystone to affirm his 
desire not to take the stand himself or to have his parents 
testify on his behalf.  See 570 F.3d at 128.  And as in 
Thomas, we are of the opinion that Blystone‘s ―terse answer 
to this inquiry does not display an intent to interfere with the 
presentation of mitigating evidence that is strong enough to 
preclude a showing of prejudice‖ in the manner that the 
conduct of the petitioners in Schriro and Taylor did.  Id.  We 
think that the only reasonable reading of the colloquy 
indicates that Blystone waived, at most, all lay witness 
testimony through his statement that he did not want 
―anybody else brought into it.‖  App. 972.  We believe it not 
only incorrect, but also unreasonable, to infer from the 
colloquy that Blystone would have prevented counsel from 
presenting any mitigating evidence, regardless of the form 
that it took.   
 
The substance of the colloquy, in combination with the 
testimony presented at the PCRA hearing, does not provide 
reason to believe that Blystone even understood that any form 
of evidence other than lay witness testimony could have been 
offered in mitigation.  Though Whiteko testified before the 
PCRA court that Blystone did not want him ―to present 
anything‖ at sentencing, App. 1172, glaringly absent from the 
record is any suggestion that Whiteko ever discussed with 
Blystone the possibility of considering mitigating evidence 
other than the testimony of Blystone or his parents.  In this 
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regard, we believe that the present case bears little 
resemblance to Schriro, in which the petitioner was certainly 
aware that other types of mitigating evidence could be 
presented on his behalf, since nearly all of the evidence that 
the petitioner claimed would have been uncovered in an 
adequate investigation was in fact proffered to the judge — 
over the interruptions of the petitioner — at sentencing.  As 
the Supreme Court put it, ―[i]n the constellation of refusals to 
have mitigating evidence presented . . . [Schriro] is surely a 
bright star.‖  Schriro, 550 U.S. at 477 (second alteration in 
original) (quotation marks omitted).  Despite the 
Commonwealth‘s extensive arguments to the contrary, the 
facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from Schriro.   
 
The fact that Blystone chose to forego the presentation 
of his own testimony and that of the two family members, 
which counsel was prepared to put on the stand, simply does 
not permit the inference that, had counsel competently 
investigated and developed expert mental health evidence and 
institutional records, Blystone would have also declined their 
presentation.  And unlike the petitioners in Schriro and 
Taylor, Blystone never behaved in a manner, either prior to or 
during sentencing, to suggest that such an inference might be 
appropriate.  We therefore ―find it impossible to predict with 
any degree of certainty what [Blystone] would have done had 
his trial counsel investigated and prepared to present all of the 
available mitigating evidence that [Blystone] now points to.‖  
Young v. Sirmons, 551 F.3d 942, 959 (10th Cir. 2008).  We 
conclude that the state court‘s belief that it could predict what 
Blystone would have done was unreasonable.  Thus, we agree 
with the District Court that the state court‘s determination that 
Blystone waived the presentation of all mitigating evidence, 
regardless of its form, was objectively unreasonable in light 
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of the evidence before it.  In turn, we also conclude that the 
state court was unreasonable in holding that Blystone‘s 
waiver prevented him from making the necessary showing of 
Strickland prejudice. 
 
Finally, we are convinced that the body of potentially 
mitigating evidence adduced at the PCRA hearing is 
sufficient to demonstrate that counsel‘s deficiencies 
prejudiced Blystone.
23
  Under Pennsylvania law, ―the jury‘s 
decision on the [death] penalty must be unanimous.‖  Jermyn, 
266 F.3d at 309.  Thus, Blystone ―can show prejudice in this 
case if there is a reasonable probability that the presentation 
of the [mitigating] evidence . . . would have convinced one 
juror to find the mitigating factors to outweigh the single 
aggravating factor the Commonwealth relied upon in this 
case.‖  Id.   
 
Had counsel‘s investigation not been deficient, the jury 
could have heard expert testimony as to Blystone‘s organic 
brain damage, bipolar disorder, and borderline personality 
disorder.  These same experts would have told the jury that, at 
the time of the crime, Blystone acted under extreme 
emotional disturbance and suffered from a substantially 
impaired capacity to conform his conduct to the law.  The 
jury also would have been told that Blystone can adapt 
successfully to institutional life and would likely not pose a 
future danger to society if sentenced to life in prison.   
                                              
23
 Because the state court did not reach the merits of the 
prejudice prong, the deferential AEDPA standard of review 
does not apply and we instead review this portion of 
Blystone‘s claim de novo.  See Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. 
Ct. 447, 452 (2009).   
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We are persuaded that the introduction of this evidence 
―might well have influenced [at least one juror‘s] appraisal of 
[Blystone‘s] moral culpability.‖  Williams, 529 U.S. at 398; 
see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) 
(―‗[E]vidence about the defendant‘s background and 
character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this 
society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are 
attributable . . . to emotional and mental problems, may be 
less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.‘‖ 
(quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) 
(O‘Connor, J., concurring))).  We, therefore, agree with the 
District Court that Blystone has demonstrated a reasonable 
probability that the result of his sentencing hearing would 
have been different, had counsel conducted an adequate 
investigation of mitigating circumstances.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the District Court‘s decision to vacate Blystone‘s 
death sentence and remand for resentencing. 
 
C. 
 
Finally, Blystone contends that the state court was 
unreasonable in rejecting the portion of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim which relates to counsel‘s alleged 
failure to investigate adequately and develop lay witness 
testimony in mitigation.  In rejecting this sub-claim, the 
PCRA court found that counsel ―spoke with [Blystone] at 
length prior to and during the trial about all aspects thereof . . 
. and interviewed [his] mother and father, as well as one 
sister, concerning [his] life, from early childhood to the time 
of trial.‖  App. 1649.  The PCRA court also found it 
significant that neither Blystone nor his family indicated to 
counsel prior to sentencing that Blystone had substance abuse 
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issues.  Relying on these factual findings, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court upheld the PCRA court‘s conclusion that 
counsel had adequately explored lay witness testimony in 
preparing for sentencing.  See Blystone II, 725 A.2d at 1206. 
 
Blystone takes issue with the state court‘s findings of 
fact, claiming that nothing in the record suggests that trial 
counsel adequately interviewed him or his family members 
regarding the existence of potentially mitigating evidence.  
Having thoroughly reviewed the record from the PCRA 
hearing, however, we agree with the District Court that the 
state court had sufficient testimony before it to support its 
findings.  Although Blystone argues that his family‘s 
testimony at the PCRA hearing contradicts counsel‘s 
assertions that he thoroughly inquired as to the existence of 
mitigating evidence, the PCRA court did not credit their 
testimony.  Neither did the PCRA court credit Sharon 
Smitley‘s testimony that Blystone was severely intoxicated on 
the night of the murder.  The PCRA court did, however, 
credit Whiteko‘s assertions that, to prepare for sentencing, he 
(1) interviewed Blystone ―continuously,‖ (2) interviewed 
Blystone‘s father about his son‘s ―childhood, when he was 
young, very young, until the day of trial,‖ App. 1144-45, (3) 
spoke with Blystone‘s mother and sister, and (4) explored the 
list of statutory mitigating circumstances with Blystone and 
his parents, inquiring as to whether they knew of anything 
that might be of use in building a mitigation case.   We, like 
the District Court, are bound by those credibility 
determinations.  
 
The disparity between the lay witness testimony that 
counsel was prepared to present at sentencing and that which 
was elicited at the PCRA hearing suggests that counsel should 
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have engaged in a more extensive investigation prior to 
sentencing.  But, in light of the record evidence and the 
constraints imposed upon us by AEDPA, we cannot conclude 
that the state court was unreasonable in finding that counsel‘s 
investigation of lay witness testimony satisfied the deferential 
standard of Strickland.
24
  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
District Court‘s denial of Blystone‘s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim to the extent that it relates to counsel‘s 
investigation and development of lay witness testimony prior 
to sentencing.
25
 
 
V. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court denying Blystone‘s Rule 59(e) motion, as 
                                              
24
 The Supreme Court‘s decision in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 
U.S. 374 (2005), does not compel a different result.  In 
Rompilla, counsel‘s investigation included interviews with 
Rompilla and some of his family members.  The Supreme 
Court recognized that the adequacy of  counsel‘s 
investigation into lay witness testimony was subject to debate, 
but held only that counsel was deficient for failing to examine 
a court file on the defendant‘s prior conviction, which was 
there ―for the asking‖ and which counsel knew would be used 
to establish an aggravating circumstance at sentencing.  Id. at 
384.  
  
25
 In affirming this denial, we decide only that the District 
Court‘s ruling on this issue of lay witness testimony was not 
in error under the standards of review set forth by AEDPA.  
We in no way hold that lay witness testimony cannot be 
presented at the resentencing hearing. 
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well as the District Court‘s judgment vacating Blystone‘s 
death sentence and remanding for resentencing. 
 
